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CHAPTER ONE:
In December,

1970,

INTRODUCTION

the British Museum put on show a

large selection of bronzes from the city of Benin,
Nigeria.

Shortly after the opening Mr. Chukwuma Osugi,

General Sec-

retary of the All Africa Students and Workers Union,
publicly
asked Lord Eccles, British Minister for the Arts, "to
instruct
the British Museum to explain when and how they acquired
the

bronzes, now worth a fortune to western collectors."

written the following paper in answer to Mr. Osugi'
Mr. Osugi reminded us of an historical truism:

s

I

have

request.
the least

predictable outcome of an historical event frequently proves
to be of the greatest historical consequence.

The British

expedition into what later became Nigeria, which confiscated
the bronzes for the British Museum, had as its goal the exten-

sion of rule into the Nigerian hinterland, and the punishment
of a recalcitrant native monarch.

Both these results were

readily accomplished, and so the matter might have ended, were
it not for the fact that the two leaders of the expedition,

Sir

Harry Rawson, and Sir Ralph Moor, ordered the removal of all
the native art work.

The results of that action are only

beginning to be explored, whereas those of the former were
readily accessible and have now been thoroughly examined by

British and African historians.

The reason for the failure to

perceive the significance of the action at the time, and for
the next seventy years,

lies in the attitude of mind which
>
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the British had toward their imperial victims, and it is
the

dimensions of this attitude which

I

hope to make clear.

Earlier empire historians who failed to take account of
the moral implications of empire are rapidly being supplanted
by

those who approach the subject of expansion from the native

point of view.

But the earlier pro-British viewpoint is

interesting precisely because it lacks the moral imperative
so obvious to us today and thereby mirrors more precisely the

state of the imperial mind at its zenith.

Work from the native

point of view has, thus far, taken the real motives for expansion, as opposed to the professed ones, as the jumping off place

and thus tended to see native attitudes and actions, perhaps

correctly, in terms of response.

It should be possible to

pinpoint incidents in which the imperial power and the native
culture confront each other in some sense in their fullness.
If one is willing to allow the artifacts of a culture some role

in the culture,

then the Benin Expedition of 1897 is such an

historical incident.

No one person from the kingdom of Benin

could speak as eloquently for the culture as could those ancient
and beautiful bronze heads.

Already when the British mounted their expedition against
Benin the British intellectual world was becoming sensitive to
the destruction which followed in the wake of the imperial advance.

An interest in primitive culture, however, thriving in England
since the founding of the ethnological societies in the 1840'

s,

was still limited to the preservation of what was rapidly

being destroyed in order to satisfy the curiosity of the destroyers

3

It had nothing to do with justice or injustice.

Rawson,

Sir Harry

for example, recognized that bronzes found in
the city

might be of historic interest to the British Museum, and
after
the expedition the government was criticized for not sending

along an anthropologist who could catch a glimpse of the culture
before the inevitable destruction.

No voice was raised in

defense of leaving the objects where they were.
Anthropologists, who did begin to play a part in imperial

administration after political boundaries had been fixed, were
the first to real ize that imperially imposed political struct-

ures were not adequate to deal with African tribal structure.
For the historian Benin did not become extricated from the

history of the Niger Coast Proct ectorate until Chief Egharevba
wrote a general history in 1930.

He managed to put down the

oral traditions of the Bini while those elders of the tribe,

who had matured before the coming of the British were still

alive and could tell him.

Earlier,

in the 1920' s,

the bronzes,

along with other works, aroused general enthusiasm for "primitive
art", and have subsequently received a fair share of critical

attention, but the Benin history project in 1957 was the first

attempt to deal with the history of Benin as a whole.

This

project, under the direction of Professor Onwuke Dike ther of
the University of Ibadan,

included an historian, an art histor-

ian, and an anthropologist.

It was an interdisciplinary attempt

to deal with the problem of writing the history of illiterate

peoples.

All three members of the team have now published books

about Benin, helping to unfold the complexities of the culture

before and during the early advent of the Europeans, to
explain
the role which the now famous bronzes have played in the
life
of the city and its inhabitants, and to document the irrevers-

ible changes wrought by the British take-over in 1897.

Alan

Ryder, the historian, decided to divide Bini history at 1897

with good reason.

After the expedition the conquerors imposed

a form of government upon the inhabitants of the city comprehen-

sible to the British but foreign to the Binis;

and removed

from the city most if not all of the art which had played an
integral role in the life of the culture.
Two points should be advanced concerning the removal of
the art.

In the first place the arrival of the objects in

England occassioned a flurry in intellectual circles then

attempting to come to terms with the "culture" of the non-

western world.

Not that the objects from Benin directly in-

fluenced a change in the appreciation of "primitive" art that is a phenomenon of the 20

'

s

- but

Benin objects flooded

the market momentarily in 1897 and those interested in West

Africa were obliged to take a stand on them.

Charles Read,

the curator of the Ethnological department of the British

Museum in 1897 and the first non-policital or military figure
to see the bronzes when they arrived in England, concluded

finally, after discovering the intricate method which had been

used in casting the pieces, that they had been made by wandering Egyptians.

His technical assistant, who analyzed the content

of the bronzes, believed that they had been made by Portuguese
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sailors on board ship off the coast of Benin.

Even Mary

Kingsley who knew more about West Africa in 1897 than most
people, suggested that some of the pieces were probably made
in Birmingham to be used as trading items.

In short, a theoret-

ical framework for appreciating the objects in a way which we

consider intelligent today was missing in 1897.

Why then, did

the British bother to take them?

Secondly,

in a most interesting way the bronzes serve as

a focal point for bringing together two facets of imperial

history, that of political conquest and cultural contact.

My

intentions here are not ambitious enough to deal directly with

either of these vast areas in terms of Benin.

But an interest

*

in the when and the how, as Mr. Osugi phrased it,

two aspects

of the Benin expedition thus far overlooked by imperial historians who write either from the British or the African point of

view, and art historians who are presently interested in under-

standing the pieces themselves, as well as a general interest
in exploitation,

led me to wonder why those involved in the

punitive expedition decided to remove the pieces, how they went
about doing it, and what they did with the pieces when they got
them home.

Chapter Five discloses how the British shipped them

out and what they did

trace.

with them, an event relatively easy to

The why of this tragic episode

I

felt could only be

understood by attempting to understand the whole short history
of the Niger Coast Protectorate, an area which never occupied

the full attention of the Foreign Office, under whose jurisdiction
it lay until after 1897,

and which only came into public view
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when the punitive expedition was mounted against
Benin.
British meant by the Benin expedition to teach a

The

lesson, not

to the Binis but to all those under the yoke of
empire, on

the effects of failure to cooperate.

The failure of the

British even to recognize what they were doing in Benin can
only sadden the reader today.
I

have taken the story up to the point where some two

hundred of the bronzes became the official property of the

British Museum.

Protectorate officials disposed of some of

the loot privately, and Foreign Office officials of the rest.
I

have not attempted here to deal with the development of an

aesthetic regarding

primitive art and the role played by

Benin, nor with to me • the more interesting question of discovering,

if it is still possible, what the Bini

removal of the bronzes was.

I

reaction to the

do not deny my bias.

I

pursued

the subject enraged against the British, yet such changes as

occurred in Benin seem to be part of the fabric of history.
Their inevitability, especially in the modern world, only makes
them the more tragic.
Since the days when slaves bearing the conquered treasure
of the Mediterranean world marched behind triumphal Roman

Legions in parade looting has been a constituent part of empire.

What foot soldiers grabbed in the heat of battle pro-consuls

distributed at home if the objects seemed to have either great

beauty or great value.

The conquerors rationalized such activity

with codes and regulations, but to those looted general and

7

soldier were equally thief.

The right of booty has been a

traditional part of war throughout history.

To the victor

belong the spoils, human slaves, gold, food, objects
of
beauty.
But by the end of the 19th century the British
explained their imperial activities to themselves not in
terms of conquest but of a civilizing mission.
For military
activities carried on within this framework there should have

been a transformation in the ancient custom of taking booty.
In light of their self justification their continued looting

was totally improper.

I

hoped to express the irony inherent

in their activity by employing the term imperial looting to

describe the activity in Benin.

8

II

In the beginning of 1897 the Benin kingdom was an obscure

and relatively unexplored part of the interior of the Niger

Coast Protectorate.

It constituted an area of approximately

4,000 square miles not yet under the sway of either direct

British administration or trade, but claimed by the British
as part of their sphere of influence following the Berlin West

Africa conference of 1885.

To strengthen the claim the British

signed a treaty with the king in 1892.

Had it not been for the

activities of a rather obscure young career officer, son of an

Anglican clergyman and graduate of Cambridge named James

R.

Phillips, the Protectorate might have remained unknown to the

British public.

But Phillips, by his death at the hands of

natives from Benin after a hastily prepared and ill-thought out

expedition to the city, occasioned a massive retaliatory effort
against King Overami which resulted in his exile and the establish
ment of British rule.

The British also removed the bronzes, for

which the city is now famous.

Conveniently, officials of the

Foreign Office, as well as earlier his torians ^"of Nigeria, saw
the conquest of Benin as a response to the murder of Phillips.

Yet policy had dictated for a long time that the king would

have to be deposed.

Had it not been for Phillips, however, the

expedition would have been much smaller, and might not have ended
in the total destruction of the city and the consequent looting.

The removal of an estimated 2500 art objects and artifacts can
in no way be seen as a premeditated act.

It was,

rather, a

thoughtless act, committed with no awareness of
consequences,
no consciousness of guilt.
Rather it resulted from the general
British ignorance of Africa - its polity,
its religion,
and

.

from the prevalent European belief in cultural evolution
which

provided the non-scientific mind with a confident belief in
the superiority of the white race.

The King, or Oba, of Benin, before his exile in September,
1897, could trace his lineage back at least to the 14 th century/

He lived with his court in a separate part of the city, roughly
in the middle of his kingdom, and he ruled a vast empire with

boundaries as a modern anthropologist terms them, "continually

expanding and contracting as new conquests were made and as
vassals on the borders rebelled and were reconquered'.'
from the time of Eweku

I,

Kings

about 1200 A.D., exacted tribute from

the settlements in their empire and were both temporal and

spiritual leaders of their people.

They, in turn,

the spiritual authority of the Oni of Ife,

recognized

to the west of Benin

the city from which legend says that the Binis

and from which they learned how to cast bronze.

originally came
4

The city had been known to European traders since the 15 th

century when the Portuguese initiated trade with the west coast
Africans and natives of Benin; several published travellers'
accounts were available in the 1890 's in English, by Portuguese
Dutch, French, and early British travellers and traders. But

since the abolition of the slave trade the area had been of
little interest to the British.

official had visited the city.

Since 1892 no Protectorate
A Londoner with an interest

10

in Africa would hardly have singled out Benin, even though

there was a relatively large literature about it.

5

The early

accounts interested administrators primarily because of the

geographic knowledge they could provide, but to the armchair

anthropologist of the time there were enough theoretical works
like Edward Tylor's Primitive Culture available to limit the

usefulness

of such musty travelers'

the officials who wrote about Benin

records.

— Sir

While most of

Richard Burton at an

earlier period, Sir Claude Macdonald, the first Consul General,
and Captain L. H. Gallwey, the first vice-consul to the Benin

district of the Protectorate

— were

familiar with earlv accounts,

a noted expert on Africa, whose first book on West Africa came

out in January,

1897, Miss Mary Kingsley, knew little of Benin.

And she claimed to have spent fifteen years reading up on everything available before actually going into the field.

For the

British public in general Benin was merely a part of the hinterland of the Niger Coast Protectorate.

Even the Protectorate hardly enjoyed extensive press coverage.

When Macdonald was chosen Consul-General in 1891 the Times

simply identified the area as "one of the most trying regions in
Africa."'

7

Lord Salisbury, theForeign Secretary under whom the

major decisions affecting the Protectorate were made, thought
o

of the whole Niger area as a "malarious African desert".

Africa

in general held a certain fascination for him, and at one point

he surrounded himself with maps of the areas into which the

imperial arm was reaching.

9

But West Africa was a rather un-

attractive pawn to be played off in the larger game of controlling the Sudan.

10

A momentary flurry of interest bristled in

11

Parliament and the press when in 1895 the men of Brass,
a city
in the Protectorate, had attacked the adjoining lands
of Sir
George Goldie's Royal Niger Company, killing several people.
They shocked the British public because they ceremoniously
ate their victims, but after a few days public attention

waned, and neither the Times nor the Manchester Guardian made

any attempt to supply background information.
The interest in Benin in 1897 owed much to the fact that
the British had no doubt about their innocence and the guilt"
of the natives.

To them it seemed clear that savage natives

had massacred innocent British officials.

Here was justification

for pseudo-scientific theories and racial opinions, as well as

proof of heroism.

The massacre appealed to the popular imperial-

ist mind as well as to the more scientifically interested, and

the "Little Englander" could not complain about imperial spending."'""'"

Also, Benin itself was fascinating for its lurid and

spectacular past.

Sir Richard Burton,

famed British explorer,

had been to the city in 1863 and had written,
fume of blood,

it stinks of death."

12

"The place has a

For what was most aston-

ishing about Benin was the frequency of human sacrifice practiced
there.

Burton saw crucified bodies on trees, "green and mildewed

skulls lying about like pebbles,"
decay.

13

bodies in various stages of

The fact that Binis practiced human sacrifice helped

strongly to justify for the British in their own minds whatever

action they took against the city.

6

12

Burton thought the city difficult to reach, decadent, and
like all West African towns, full of drunken chiefs and
thieves.
He knew about the earlier accounts, knew that to the
Portuguese

of the 16 th century it had been "Great Benin", but believed it
to have been ruined by 1700. 14

By then European trade had stopped

almost completely, the final fatal blow to prosperity coming with
the supression of the slave trade in the 19 th century.

Burton

believed that whatever greatness there had been in Benin was
to be attributed to contact with Europe and European goods.

The breaking of that brought a return to savagery.

Sir Richard

lamented that in the England of his day Benin was just "the

unknown kingdom"."''^
Captian

H.

L.

Gallway, writing some thirty years later,

echoed most of Burton's views when he described his trip to

Benin to secure the treaty.

He thought the whole area "the

most unhealthy place in the world."

1

Although he mentioned

the earlier travellers' accounts he felt that little of value
to the administrator was known about the city.

a frightful place, untouched by Christianity,

To him it was

littered with

skulls and bodies and other evidence of human sacrifices, and

ruled by a king under the thumb of fetish priests who exercised

areignof terror.

These two accounts strongly colored the press

presentation of Benin in 1897.
The British knew nothing of the kingdom, the power of the
king, or the way in which political power was used.

Gallwey

.

13

said that not even the king knew the limits of his power. 18
No one knew of the pressures on the kingdom to the north
from
the Moslem

inhabitants of Nupe; to the west from the city of

Ekiti; and to the east from the Royal Niger Company 19 nor indeed,

how the king reacted to pressure from the south, from the Protectorate.

No one in the Protectorate, or for that matter in the

press at home, even entertained the notion that the powers

within the kingdom of Benin might be alive to external pressures
and in turn, be developing counter strategies to control them.

Recent historians of West Africa agree 20 that the fate of
places like Benin, in the hinterlands was sealed when in the
last decades of the 19 th century informal commercial ties were
#

replaced by formal government protection; government protection,
a kind of inexpensive expansion, replaced by the extension of

administration.

The British in the Niger Coast Protectorate

were especially interested in defining their interior boundaries

against the encroachments of the Germans and the French.
was no longer a safe way of securing boundaries in the mid

Bluff
'

90

'

s

To set a boundary surveys had to be made, and an officer pre-

sent all the time to drive away the interloper.

A further reason for penetration into the hinterland related
to the extension of trade.

For centuries Europeans had been

trading with Africans through middlemen, entrepreneurs who would

carry European goods into the interior and return, sometimes
years later, with commodities; at first slaves, and later palm
oil, nuts, and rubber.

George Goldie of the Royal Niger Company

14

realized that a more efficient system could be worked
out if
the African middleman was removed.
The middlemen suffered
in the eyes of the British for having been identified
with

the slave trade anyway,

2 1

and the British often accused

them of controlling trade for their own interests.

The

Liverpool traders who worked in the Protectorate lands were
eager for the removal of middlemen because more profit would

accrue to them.

Indeed removal of the middlemen formed a part

of Protectorate policy from the very beginning. 22

The extension

of trade, much talked about in the '90's as a good which would

benefit all, was in fact a policy which demanded the elimination
of a large segment of native economy.

A third justification for the extension of rule into the

hinterland was the humanitarian motivation, what one historian
has aptly called a "rescue service" for natives.
the first Consul General of the Protectorate,

imperial administrators of his day.

23

Macdonald,

typfied many

He opposed the monopolistic

practices of Goldie in the company lands because he believed
in free trade.

He also opposed Goldie'

s

policy of non-inter-

ference in native affairs because he thought it his duty to

bring civilization to the African people, even if it meant

changing their lives drastically.

However, he also believed

that Africans would see the virtues of British civilization

and choose it themselves if they received a proper introduction
to it.

The man who followed him as Consul-General

Moor, was an able administrator.

,

Sir Ralph

But in his eagerness to get

15

things done, he lacked the particular patience of his predecesso
In an area as small as the Niger Coast Protectorate this lack

of patience became extremely important in determining events.

While Macdonald intuitively acknowledged the dignity of African
rulers, no matter how small their domain, Moor thought them

despots holding their people in chains.

Although the goals

might be the same, the means which these two men employed
were vastly different.

Where Macdonald had used the palaver,

Moor favored the punitive expedition.
Under Moor the punitive expedition against the king of

Benin was mounted and the expected results achieved.
expedition, a

The

complete success, could be pointed to with pride

as a masterpiece of planning and adaptability to the unforseen.

The "bloodthirsty monarch" was removed and the rule of law put
in his place.

The land was opened up to trade.

The advance

of civilization was expressed by the creating of a native

council, a post office, and a golf links.

2 ^4

And the bronzes

from Benin went on show at the British Museum.
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CHAPTER TWO:

PRELUDE TO PHILLIPS

When the British decided to develop administration
in
what had so far been a "paper protectorate",
Salisbury approached
Claude Macdonald with the offer of the consul
generalship
rather than

H.

H.

Johnston, who had been serving in that capacity.

The foreign minister was interested in a conservative
diplomat
for the post rather than a man whom one historian
has called a

"rabid imperialist,
quickly.

" l

who might be expected to tax the budget too

Macdonald, a career soldier, had graduated from Upping-

ham and Sandhurst, had fought in the Egyptian campaign of 1882,
had served as military attache to Sir Evelyn Baring in Cairo,
had been on the Suakin expedition of 1884-85, and had served as

acting consul general in Zanzibar from 1887-88.

In 1889 he had

headed a special commission to the Niger territories to decide
what sort of administration should be imposed.

Salisbury at

the time favored handing the territories over to the Royal Niger

Company so that Sir George Goldie would have the private responsibility for developing empire in terms of trade.

Macdonald,

however, discovered that the Africans, themselves preferred crown
rule.

The earl accepted his findings, with modification, and

Macdonald was an obvious choice to head the new Protectorate.
Macdonald had wanted the area, then known as the Oil Rivers,
accepted as a Crown Colony, but the Foreign Office opted for

Protectorate status until such time as an effective administration
o

could be established.

Development was to be the key word. So

far as Macdonald was concerned, only the grandchildren of the
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present generation would reap the rewards
of work now being
3
done.
Reaction to his appointment was favorable.

The Times

noted:

"He has shown so much competency,

tact, and knowledge

of African conditions in the past, and has
been so successful
in the performance of many trying duties,

that there is every

reason to believe that his appointment to the Oil Rivers
will
be attended with the best results." 4 The new consul
arrived
in the Protectorate in July,

consuls.

1891, with his staff and six vice-

He divided the area into six districts with Old

Calabar, his residence, as the capitol.

Bonny and Mew Calabar

constituted the second district, Opobo the third, Brass the
fourth, Warri the fifth, and the Benin River, under Captain

Henry Lionel Gallwey, the sixth.

Hacdonald hired Ralph

floor.

To head a native constabulary

Moor, a young Irishman, had served

as a district inspector in the Irish constabulary, and had re-

signed on private grounds to make his way to the Protectorate.

5

The Foreign Office instructed Macdonald to find out what

treaties had been made with local chiefs, and to make sure the
chiefs understood them.

Eventually the Foreign Office hoped to

bring them all under a "uniform system of government." 6

The

consul was to develop trade, put an end to slavery, and promote
7

civilization by ending barbarous customs.'

The six vice-consuls

possessed a separate Queen's commission to enable them to perform
acts which otherwise would have demanded the permission of

parliament.

They then had some degree of freedom, at least in

carrying out the assignments of their chief.

The Times had

.
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stressed the humanitarian aspect of the administration.

It

noted that "the whole of the Consular staff will
endeavor by
developing legitimate trade, by promoting civilization,
by

inducing the natives to relinquish unhuman and barbarous
customs, and by gradually abolishing domestic slavery,
to

pave the way for placing the territories over which Her

Majesty's protection

British rule." 8

is and

may be extended directly under

The article further commented upon the for-

mation of the constabulary and noted "in time we may hope
that the law will reach well into the interior, and that free

traffic will be carried on without the intervention of middle-

men

,,9
11

Goldie, bitterly disappointed at not getting the extension
of territory for which he had hoped, had moved quickly.

He

secured treaties from hinterland chiefs before the interior

boundaries were officially settled.
ies."^

He even forged some treat-

The head of the Niger Company wanted to make particular

ly sure that the powerful Brassmen would be barred by boundary

from their former markets. The Foreign Office, dimly aware of
the competition, had accepted Goldie

's

progressive policy of

direct trade, and had agreed to a line which divided the Brass-

men from their

markets."'""'"

Both Macdonald and Moor would suffer

from the Foreign Office's lack of foresight.

Macdonald issued his own istructions to his vice-consuls.
They should open up friendly relations with towns near their
stations; assess the natural resources of their areas; sign
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new treaties; collect intelligence; collect import duties;
and
operate postal services. 12 Communication with the hinterland
was essential for effective administration.

Macdonald continued

in his area using the methods he knew, the palaver and the treaty. 13
The year 1891 saw no bloodshed and an increased revenue.
In 1892 Vice-Consul Gallwey signed a treaty with the King

of Benin.

Gallwey, a graduate of Cheltenham and Sandhurst, the

son of a colonial official serving in Bermuda, was on his first

assignment in West Africa.

The year before he had gone into

the hinterland of his district and decided that the Itsekiri

and Urhobo chiefs were incapable of making a treaty, or, if
made, incapable of keeping it. 1 ^

The Bini chiefs he found

somewhat more accessible, for his treaty with the king of Benin

followed upon this initial failure.

In his report on the event

he noted "I am of the opinion that there are very great possibilities
for this district.

Time and much patience will be required,

however, before the resources of the district can be, even in
a measure, developed,

the great stumbling-block to any immediate

advance being the fetish 'reign of terror' which exists throughout the Kingdom of Benin, and which will require severe measures
in the not very distant future before it can be stopped."

"Mow

that a treaty exists between Her Majesty and the King of Benin,"
he added, "it is to be hoped that the undoubted wealth of the

country will be developed, and the barbarous customs, more
especially the human sacrifices, abolished."
however, with a question.

He concluded,

"How far the King of Benin is to

be trusted remains to be seen; his advisers appeared to me
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to be a set of intriguing
and

l ying

individuals.'^

The

implication was clear: the
land was promising, but
the British
ability to make use of it
depended upon the king.
If he
would not abide by his treaty,
and Gallwey did not think
for a minute that he would,
then other measures should
be
considered.
Consul-General Macdonald 's Annual
Report for the
Protectorate for 1892 showed an
increase in revenue from
L96,000 in 1891 to L169,000
and had noted an absence of
conflicts between British and
natives.
Macdonald received
the KCMG.
At home on leave, he summed
up his policy to a
Liverpool audience:
"....to advance slowly, leaving no
bad
or unfinished work behind, to
gain the respect and liking of
natives, by a firm and judicious
conduct of af
fairs .... are

the means which,

Africa."

in my humble opinion,

lead to success in

If Macdonald sensed the incompatibility
between

his own ideas and those of his
subordinate, Gallwey, he did
not remark on it.
•

In the Spring of 1893 the name of the
Protectorate was

changed from the Oil Rivers to the Niger Coast
Protectorate.
The change reflected a new boundary agreement
with

the Germans,

concluded in mid-April, 1893. 18

The new boundary extended

German territory northward in order to limit French
advances,
for the British feared at this time that the French
wished
to forge an east-west link across Africa. 19

Had the French

been able to achieve such a goal it would have threatened the
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British in the Sudan.

A bit of hinterland seemed a small

price to pay to prevent the danger.
By 1894 Macdonald's staff had grown to forty people, 20

and

by the summer, there had been no bloodshed.

At what

did not appear to be a critical time Macdonald went home
on
leave and Ralph Moor took over as Acting-Consul-General.

Before his superior returned in December Moor organized
and carried out the first armed expedition against a native

chief in the Protectorate.

The object of the attack was

Chief Nana, son of the Itsekiri chief Oluma who had been in
charge of trade in the Benin River in the 1880'

Oluma died the British Consul in the area
Nana to succeed him. 21

s.

When

had appointed

With the gradual development of

the policy of eliminating African middlemen, openly accepted
in 1891, Nana's days were numbered.

Although he had already

been deprived of his title of governor of the river by the

British Consul in 1890, yet he persisted in directing and
controlling trade.
In April of 1894 Macdonald warned him that he did not

have exclusive rights in the river.
to give up his privileges.

Nana, however, refused

In June, with Macdonald gone,

Moor sent the ship Alecto up the river to threaten him.
The chief momentarily backed down, but in August, he was

back directing trade.

Once again Moor sent the Alecto

time with directions to fire rockets.

,

this

The Acting Consul

succeeded, in prodding the lesser chiefs in the river to band
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together and sign a treaty requesting protection against
Nana.
It read:

"Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britian and Ireland,

Empress of India, in compliance with the request of the
Chiefs

and people of Benin River and Jekri country, hereby undertakes
to extend to them and to the territory under their authority

and jurisdiction, her gracious favor of protection.

1,22

On August 22nd Moor reported to the Foreign Office his

trouble with Chief Nana,

23
"

and on the 31st notified them that

he had sustained heavy casualties while reconnoitering in
the area.

2 A-

The Foreign Office then author! zed him to remove

the troublesome chief.

Moor burned and destroyed Nana's

capitol city but the chief managed to flee to Lagos where
he finally gave himself up, throwing himself on the mercy
of the British government and asking the Foreign Office to

intervene in his behalf. 25

At his trial in Lagos Nana main-

tained that Consul Moor had interferred with his attempts to

control the trade of his sub-chiefs.

Subsequently the Consul

had begun "to persecute him, interfering with his trade and

starving his people, and after a time the Alecto came and

blew up his gates."

26

Nana had indeed resisted Moor, fearing

the exile which had been the fate of a previous trader on the

river.

27

The chief was found guilty and was exiled;

the

Foreign Office sent word that his goods and chattels were
to be declared forefeit.

28

A chief more amenable to British

control was put in his place.
But Consul Moor remained unsatisfied with conditions on

26

the river.

The Bini appeared likely to take over
where Nana
had left off, and an obscure expedition to
Benin by
a Mr.

McTaggart of the Royal Niger Company made him fear
that the
King would be more alert to the liklihood of
attack. 29 Whatever others found there, for Moor Benin was clearly
"showing
signs of disturbance." 30

Yet even Moor's picture is ambiguous

it appears from Gallwey's 1892 Report that Moor did
not think
the Binis brave fighters; 31 and in his retrospective
summary

of his activities at this time Moor wrote "I had all arrange-

ments made for bringing up a force to march into Benin City,
as from the messages

I

had exchanged with the King

I

was of

the opinion that very little resistance would be experienced
in establishing a military post there."

There is scant

evidence for the opinions of the King after the attack on
Nana, but it is likely that from this time on he feared that
a similar fate would befall him.

Before Moor could move against the king Macdonald

returned to the Protectorate.

Moor recalled later,

5th December Sir Claude Macdonald arrived, and

I

"On the

informed

him

of the steps taken, when the matter was fully discussed and
the conclusion arrived at that pacific means should be tried

for a further period...."

33

Macdonald

— aware

that the other

chiefs were concerned over the treatment meted out to Nana,
fell back upon his former policy, successful since 1888, of

consultation with them in an effort to win their confidence.
He visited Sapele, Warri, Brass, Degema, Bonny, Opobo, and

Old Calabar,

34

but not Benin.

27

In 1895 Sir Claude decided
to extend administration
to
the Ibo hinterland.
The attack of the Brass natives
on the
headquarters of the Royal Niger Company
at Akassa however,
prevented his acting. This most serious
disturbance, which

erupted in February, owed to circumstances
extending back
to the founding of the Royal Niger
Company, and Goldie's
expressed goal of removing the African
middlemen.
The Brassmen, a strong group of up river traders,
had for a while
found an ally in the Liverpool African
Association, which
sided with them in the hope of crushing Goldie's
monopoly.
In June of 1893, however, Goldie had succeeded
in winning over
the Liverpool traders.

The Brassmen were left defenseless.

The boundary of 1891 had separated their homes from
their

markets and with the African Association out of the way,
officials of the company began a systematic attempt to

eliminate the Brassmen as competitors by keeping them from
their markets.

The Brassmen Countered with a system of

smuggling hampered by pot shots from the Company shores.

In

November, 1894 a new King had succeeded to the Brass throne,
and under him the attack took place.

It was a great success:

"The stores and warehouses were looted and torn down.

The

Prisoners and booty were loaded into 40 or 50 war-canoes,
and triumphal return to Nimbe began, with drums beating and
flags flying, openly parading past the house of the amazed

and impotent vice-consul." 35

Retribution was bound to be

s
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fast.

Goldie quite naturally wanted
Nimbe destroyed, but
Macdonald, aware of the real grievances
of the Brassmen,

urged no reprisals.

An attack on British property and
the
cannibalising of native servants had to
be dealt with however, and the Royal Navy was ordered
to organize an expedition
against Nimbe. The force consisted of two
gunboats,
one

yacht,

two company steamers,

three Protectorate launches,

three men of war steam pinnaces, and eight
surf boats.
They
advanced against Nimbe and the adjoining town and
on February 28
Admiral Bedford telegraphed to the Admiralty that
he had destroy
ed Fishtown and Nimbe. 3
The raid and subsequent attack occasioned comment in

Parliament and in answer to a query by

Bayley, Sir Edward

T.

Grey explained that the attack was unexpected.

He said "It

was known that the Brassmen, who previously had been in the

position of middlemen and had a monopoly of the trade from the
interior, had lost that monopoly by the opening up of the country
in the interior by the Niger Company.

have been the cause of the outbreak." 37

This was believed to

Macdonald had explain-

ed the commercial situation to the Foreign Office, causing

Clement Hill, the Permanent Under-secretary for African Affairs
to comment,

regarding Macdonald'

s

softness,

"It is strange

oo

that cannibalism is continuously ignored."

On February 28th

Sir Charles Dilke commented in Parliament on Macdonald'

assertion that the Company had deprived the Brassmen of their
livelihood, and that natives complained of sniping by Company

agents.

39

The natives,

made to "eat the dust",

indeed, claimed that they had been

^

a dramatic metaphor for the reality
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of having been cut off by boundary
from their food supply.

Dilke proposed that there be an inquiry,
and Grey agreed to
hold one.
The subsequent inquiry headed by Sir
John Kirk,

recommended that customs barriers be removed
between Company
and Protectorate lands and that the Company
function as
a purely administrative unit, as had
the East India Company
in its last years of power in India.

With the situation settled, at least in theory,
Macdonald
once again prepared to return to England.
Before leaving
he discussed the Benin situation with Moor, who
would be in

charge during his absence.

They agreed that Vice-Consul

Major Copeland-Crawford should make an attempt to reach the
city of Benin on a friendly visit. 42 Macdonald left, not
for the leave he had anticipated, but to be transferred to

Peking.

On his recommendation, Ralph Moor became Consul

General.

Moor wanted Gallwey, the original appointee in the Benin
district as his Deputy Commissioner, but the Foreign Office

appointed James

R.

Phillips instead. 43

Phillips had served

in a variety of jobs in West Africa and his appointment was

due either to seniority or influence at home.

an archbishop in England, whereas Gallwey'

s

His father was

was an administrator

in Bermuda.
As Consul General, Moor outlined his plans for Lord

Salisbury.

He intended

to

undertake peaceful expeditions to

^ ^
30

explain the aim of government and to
start friendly relati oris
with native chiefs; he hoped to organize
native councils in
towns where friendly reception occurred;
he planned
surveys

for roads and resources; he intended to make
treaties of
peace and friendship. But he also would inflict
punishments
and suppress piracy.

When Moor assumed his duties three areas demanded
his
immediate attention: Brass, to be administered according

to

the report of Commissioner Kirk; the Cross River where
trade

was disrupted by rival fighting; and the Bonny and Opobo

hinterland already earmarked by Macdonald as the next target
for the extension of rule. 45

Less pressing, but important

«

to Moor was the situation in Benin.

A pattern emerges in

Moor's dispositions of these areas.

In the case of Brass,

he offered concessions which he had worked out with Goldie.

When they were rejected by the king, he went over the king's
head and established a native council.

To the warring

Cross towns he sent a force of 180 men under Captains

Roupell and Cockburn who shelled and burned them.

He had

heard that human sacrifice was practiced in the two hinterland towns.

Against one he organized an expedition with

Gallwey of 105 men.

Even though the king asked for peace

Moor deported him and his priests, and burned the juju houses
Captain Roupell led 120 troops into the other town, burned
the houses, chopped down trees, and looted what was left

of the livestock

.

:

.
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In dealing with Benin Moor was less
successful.

Major

Copeland-Crawford left for Benin in August, 1895.
Messages
had been sent by Crawford to King Overami
to inform him of
the intended visit and arrangements for
guides to carry

the

men into the bush were complete.

On August 3rd a detachment

of 30 men and a maxim gun arrived under the
command of Capt-

ain Maling to escort Crawford.
to the king returned.

Some days later the messengers

They reported the king anxious about

the expedition for he had heard that a large number of war-

ships sailed to attack him.

The king's own messenger who

accompanied Crawford's agents, was to personally see whether
the rumor was true. After assuring the King's messenger that

no warships accompanied the expedition, Crawford started out.
He arrived by boat at the town of Gwato,

20 miles

and was warned by friendly natives not to land.

from Benin

When he

disembarked anyway, his carriers refused to march the rest
of the way to Benin and left him in the night.

Crawford went

home
In his subsequent report to the Foreign Office, Captain

Crawford included some details about an exchange of notes with
the king in which the latter complained about his being unable
to get gun powder after his signing the treaty with the Queen.

Crawford concluded
"Notes have been made as to Gwato town, its
approaches and capabilities for the housing of
troops in case of any further trouble the same
;

.
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has been done with respect to Oubagilligilli
about 3/4 of a mile from Gwato on the same
bank.
Information has also been gained of the waterway to Icoro, another route to Benin city; rough
soundings have been taken occasionally from the
first island in Gwato Creek to the junction of
Icoro and Gwato town Creek.
Captain Mailing has
taken a rough sketch plan of Gwato town and its,,
approaches, which is duly forwarded to you
" 47
In recording his experiences later for Macmillan's
Mag-

azine Crawford mentioned a conversation supposed to have taken
place before his expedition, between a British officer and the
king of Benin.
replied,

"I

When asked if he would extend trade the king

have allowed the white queen to place four small

factories at the mouth of my river; but

I

am always King of

Benin, and the next white man who enters my creek will be

shot." 48

Crawford also talked about an ivory fence and fine

stores of ivory worth LI, 400 a ton, which he had heard about

from traders.

49

The king of Benin, Crawford thought, was

"merely a blood-thirsty savage", but he wanted to point out
that there was more to Africa than savages.
the subjects of Benin,
to the north,

He compared

"heathen and rank savages", to the negro*

"tinged with the semi-civilization of the Arabs":

It was easy to distinguish them:

other is something better.

"

^

"the one is a savage;

the

Crawford was not alone in this

feeling of aversion toward natives of the Protectorate in
favor of Moslem negroes.

Ralph Moor, when organizing the

constabulary in 1891 had chosen Hausas from the north, thinking them more reliable than the inhabitants of the Protector-

-53

ate

Moor sent Crawford's official report to the Foreign
Office with his

own conclusions.

He explained that few have
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ever reached the city, but at
least one who had stated:
"Benin city reeked of human blood.- 53
Human sacrifices,
Moor asserted, were frequent. The
treaty of 1892 had been
practically inoperative. The king
according to Moor's
interpretation, had refused to see Crawford
because of his
juju celebrations for new yams which
occasioned numerous
human sacrifices. The country should be
brought under
British control "if necessary by force".
Finally
the

Consul concluded,

"I

am sure that any expenditure incurred

would be fully compensated by the large increase
that would
result in the sale of British manufactured goods
in the

country opened up."

)Zf

Recalling the report later Moor commented:

"I

recommend-

ed that force should be employed to open up this
country to

civilization and trade and to prevent the horrible human
sacrifices and cruelties which were continually taking place
therein.

The instructions in reply to this were that pacific

measures should be employed for a further period before resorting to force." 5 5
Nothing further happened in Benin until the Fall of
1896 when Moor went home on leave, leaving his Deputy

Commissioner, James Phillips, in charge.

,
,

.
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CHAPTER THREE:

THE PHILLIPS MASSACRE

Phillips was certainly aware of
the programs and policies
of his chief.
Perhaps he and Moor had even
talked over the
possibility of carrying out an expedition
against the king of
Benin in the dry months of 1897. At
any rate, in November of
1896, shortly after he assumed his duties
as Consul General,
he wrote to Lord Salisbury at the
Foreign Office:
"I
ask his

Lordship's permission to visit Benin City
in February next, to
depose and remove the King of Benin, and
to establish a native
council in his place, and take such further

steps for the open-

ing up of the country as the country may
require." 1

Furthermore

Moor was "fully cognizant of all matters dealt with
in this
despatch".
As an afterthought, probably with Crawford in

mind,

Phillips added:

"I

have reason to hope that sufficient ivory

may be found in the Kings house to pay the expenses incurred
in

removing the King from his stool." 2

He obviously added this

optimistic hope in order to encourage Lord Salisbury, disincline
to spend a penny more than necessary on West Africa.

For reasons which remain obscure, Phillips, while waiting
for a reply from the Foreign Office, decided to make a prior

visit to the king.

Perhaps, confident of Salisbury's approval,

he wanted to make one last try to bring about by peaceful means

what would inexorably come by force.

Several other officers

from the Protectorate agreed to go with him on a peaceful
mission; Captain Maling, who had been with Crawford as the

.
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intelligence officer in 1895; Crawford himself,
just back from
leave; Locke, one of the men whcm the Brass chiefs
had accused
of harraunging them; and Captain Alan Boisragon,
who had re-

placed Moor as head of the constabulary.

Boisragon wrote a

newsy letter home to his wife on November 25 th announcing
the
expedition, and giving as a reason for

it

that Phillips wished

to see the city. 3

The leaders decided to include traders who

knew the country.

They invited the representatives of James

Pinnock of Liverpool to go with them.

Gallwey in 1892.

Pinnock had been with

Unable to go himself, he sent two other

traders, Powis and Gordon,

in his stead. 4

Powis was compar-

atively new to the river, but Gordon, who Brassmen had also
mentioned, had been in the area for about five years and was

popular with the traders.
While he proceeded with his own arrangements for this
small expedition, Phillips sent to the Foreign Office a letter

which he had solicited from Mr.

J.

W.

Brownridge, an agent for

the Scottish trading company of Alexander Miller.

intended to encourage action on his scheme.

It

The letter

outlined the

sorry state of affairs in Benin and attempted to pinpoint the

blame on the king. It began:
"In answer to your request for a few
facts regarding Benin and its trade, I may say
that the primary cause of the present stoppage
of trade is the raising of the price of guns,
powder and gin.

"The king, finding that he cannot buy
these articles at the price he likes, is now
keeping on the stoppage to extort as much money
Stoppages of trade
as possible from the Jackris.
are of common occurance in Benin.
.

.
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"There are also various times in the
year stoppages on account of fetish, when
numbers of human beings are sacrificed
the subjects of the King of Benin have
no'
inducement to trade whatever. Were a nati
to trade well and amass money, it would
be
highly dangerous to him; the king or his
chiefs would bring some trumpery charge
of whitchcraft against him, which either
means death or the loss of all his money "

There followed further references to the dreadfulness
of life in Benin, whose people suffered robbery and
menace

of the King's messengers.

Brownridge concluded:

"The stable articles of trade in this
country are salt, common fathom cloths,
and gin, etc., silk and other superior
articles being very little bought,
which goes to show they are a very poor
race.
This, I think, is through the
lack of opportunity, and the insecurity of life and property .... I f Benin
was under proper government, and the
resources of the country properly developed, I am firmly of the opinion
that the exports would be very great.
So long as the King ofBenin is allowed to carry on as he is doing at present it means simply losses to the merchants, native Jackri trade, as also
the Protectorate "5
.

.The letter obviously fortified Phillips conviction that

he should attack the king.

And here, from both the commercial

and humanitarian viewpoints, was ample justification.

But

Francis Bert ie permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office
,

had already taken some steps of his own, even before the Brown
ridge letter arrived.

On December 24 th he forwarded Phillips

first letter to Consul-General Moor, then in London.

At the

same time Bertie requested information from the Intelligence

Division of the Foreign Office about the feasibility of a

40

punitive expedition to Benin.

Moor responded immediately.

6

For Bertie's, and ultimately

Lord Salisbury's, benefit he attempted
to recapitulate the
connection which he and the Protectorate
had maintained with
the King and City of Benin.
He referred to his plans of
November, 1894 when, after putting down Chief
Nana, he had
hoped to move on to Benin, only to be told by
Macdonald
to

pursue peaceful means.

He told of how he and Macdonald had

decided upon sending Copland-Crawford to Benin in
the summer
of 1895, of the failure of that visit, his own
desire to use

force, and of Macdonald'
ful measures.

s

instructions again to follow peace-

Moor stated that such measures had been tried,
»

but

"....further pacific measures are quite useless and only likely to damage the prestige of
the Government with all the surrounding native
tribes.
The state of the case", Moor continued,
"and the position of affairs is generally very
clearly put by Mr. Phillips, but he does not, I
think, lay sufficient stress on the human sacrifices which it is known are carried on extensively and the state of abject misery in which
the people are kept by the exactions of the King
and his JuJu men, and by their being prevented
trading ....Both European and native Jekri traders
are being gradually ruined by the attitude adopted
by the King, and the advance of civilization is
actually stopped."/
Moor, convinced as he had been for sometime that force was

now the only remedy, seemed to assume his readers at the Foreign
Office of like mind.

For he now addressed himself to the ques-

tion of what size force should be used.

In determining size,

he wished his superiors to know that he was confident that all

necessary intelligence work had been carried out, and that a
j

reliable guess as to the expected enemy force could be made.

-
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"The king", he said "should be deposed and removed
from the

country, and the ring of JuJu men broken up."

The only time

to carry out the operations, he felt, would be February
or

March before the rains.

He anticipated scant opposition from

Benin, but suggested that a gunboat and a small force of marines

with a Maxim gun should be used.

Moor stated his willingness

to proceed to the Protectorate immediately,

if such should be

thought necessary.

While he digested Moor's comments Bertie received a reply
from the Intelligence Division on the 30 th "on the subject of
a possible punitive expedition to be undertaken against the

King of Benin...." g

The writer warned of but scanty information

"as to this potentate's power of resistence".

Moor had based

his opinion solely on the chance comment of Gallwey in 1892

that the Binis were not brave and not likely to be helped by

their neighbors.

Gallwey

1

s

The intelligence correspondent referred to

report "that the population of Benin city does not

exceed 10,000."

He briefly described the approach to the city

and argued that a force of 400 native troops officered by Eng-

lishmen and armed with breech-loaders,

2

seven pound guns, one

Maxim and one rocket apparatus, should be adequate.

He mention-

ed that Sir John Ardagh "conscious of the untoward results which

might ensue from the jamming of the single Maxim gun detailed
to accompany the force would, as a matter of precaution, prefer
to see another of these weapons added to the armament of the

troops forming the expedition."

The objection to a large force,

"

.

^

^
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the writer pointed out, was that it would destroy
the element
of surprise.

With surprise assured, the force proposed should

be adequate.

The Brownridge letter arrived on the 1st of Jan-

uary, and on the 4 th the Colonial Office sent word that Joseph

Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, would "instruct the officer

administering the Government of Lagos to render Mr. Phillips
such assistence as he can with regard to the contemplated
q

expedition.
All seemed in readiness for Phillips to move in February,
but on the

6 th of

January word came from the Intelligence Div-

ision to the Foreign Office that it would not be safe to remove
troops from Lagos at the moment.

Perhaps troops could be ob-

tained from the Gold Coast, Sir John Ardagh had suggested.
A small force of marines could also be included.

There followed

some checking around to see if troops might be obtained from
the Gold Coast.

It was discovered that they were unavailable,

being occupied in manoeuvres against Bona, Wa and Gambaga

^

Sir Clement Hill summed up the situation for his chief

Lord Salisbury on January

6 th

.

Phillips, Hill noted, had pro-

posed 400 men, and Sir John Ardagh did not consider it safe,

with the limited information available, to go ahead with fewer.
Moor, however, Sir Clement continued, believed two gun-boats

might safely substitute for the loss of from 150 to 250 troops.
Hill reviewed correspondance dating back to 1895.

When Moor

proposed action in that year he had not thought the Protectorate
force adequate.

Hill now averred:
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Lord Salisbury apparently thought the risk
of failure
greater than the possible loss of prestige. He wrote
to

Phillips on January 9^

•

that the expedition would have to be

postponed for another year because 400 troops could not now
be raised."^

With the planned expedition which Moor had hoped for since
1894 cancelled, affairs in the Protectorate should have returned
to their usual quiet,

and faded into the background of concern

at the African desk in the Foreign Office.

It

might have been

so had not Phillips, while waiting for word, decided upon a

preliminary, and as it turned out, fatal, unarmed expedition
to the King.

On January 10 th

,

just one day after word had been

sent to inform him of the postponment, a telegram reached the

Foreign Office from the Benin district, informing them that
Phillips and those with him had been ambushed
to Benin, and were supposed dead.

on

their way

"
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II

The explanation of why Phillips had
undertaken this

preliminary trip never came out.
When the telegram arrived at the Foreign Office,
it
caused considerable commotion. Salisbury, at
his country
home, was immediately notified and came directly
into London

from Hatfield. 13

Ralph Moor was called in for immediate

consultation with Curzon, the Under Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, and Sir Thomas Saunderson, Permanent Secretary at
the Foreign Office.

Mr. Goschen,

Admiralty, was informed.

the First Lord of the

The Manchester Guardian noted

that "most of the captives" for they were not then known
to be dead,

"were well known in official and club circles

in London.

Almost immediately the wheels were set in motion for a

punitive expedition to be carried out against the king.

No

one spoke in public of the arrangements of the previous two

weeks.

The press, and through them the public, knew only that

savage natives had ambushed government officials.

learned that the ambush had resulted in death.
the papers carried a telegram from Gallwey:

Soon they
On January 26 th

"No possible

doubt, Phillips, Maling, Crawford, Campbell, and Elliot shot

dead in the ambush.

Boisragon and Locke in no danger."

1

"*
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Nor was there any doubt that the group had
been unarmed when
attacked.
Captain Boisragon, 16 safely back in the Protectorate, related how Phillips had insisted that they
go without

weapons visible. 17
the low eighties,

Since the weather was hot, 18 probably in
they wore no jackets and consequently had

their revolvers in their baggage, carried by porters some

distance behind them.

When first attacked Boisragon announc-

ed that he was going to get his revolver.

But Phillips, in

a moment of high drama, and no doubt still hopeful, commanded:
"No revolvers,

gentlemen, no revolvers!"

panions died.

Boisragon and Locke, both wounded, crawled into

Thus he and his com-

the thick bush and, drinking dew and eating leaves for five

days, made their way painfully back to safety.

The apparent circumstances, therefore, cried out for

vengence.

Policy statements were unnecessary.

The papers

could now create a picture of the king and of his society which

would explain the ghastly act.

Available information about the

city was difficult to interpret. The accounts of Burton and

Gallwey emerged as authoritative
the single most interesting fact.

19

and human sacrifice as
For the first time Benin,

the City of Blood, became generally known in England.

Papers first carried news of the disaster on the 12 th
The Times simply named those

been on the expedition.

.

English officials known to have

The Manchester Guardian located the

city some 60 miles up the Benin River, "a large town, the
seat of a powerful theocracy of fetish priests

cto be famous for its human sacrifices."

..20

(which) used

"
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On January

iff*

the Guardian talked of the
"Benin tyrant- and

reported an interview with Sir John Kirk
who had conducted
the Brass inquiry of 1895.
In the interview he described
the Benin people as "a degraded race
very much on
a level

with the Ashantis...."

The Oba, Kirk said, although he ad-

mitted that he personally knew nothing of the
king, "stops
all trade to Benin, will allow no white trader
to enter his
district, and was constantly having executions."
Kirk summed
up his feeling about the whole area as follows:

heard.... not from people who were likely
to exaggerate, but from people who had been there
and described what they saw, that there were dead
bodies and remains of executions lying about the
town.
It was absolutely certain that there must
have been an expedition against him sooner or later
if he did not reform, and I do not think there was
the least chance of his giving up his evil customs,
as he was entirely in the hands of the fetish priests.
It was a disgrace upon any civilized Protectorate to
have such a center in its sphere. "21
"I

The death of Phillips offered proof of the savage char-

acter of Benin, proof of the need for a civilizing mission.
A humanitarian interpretation, complete with evil leaders and

people needing to be saved from them dominated the telling of
the Benin story.

Hints in the press that another type of

expedition had been planned against the king with no Phillips
to justify it went unnoticed.

A Reuters correspondant in Liver-

pool interviewed a trader who chose not to reveal his name, who said
"An attack upon Benin had been much talked of.

at least it has been threatened, and

I

For two years

have no doubt at all

that the king of Benin has been fully acquainted with all these

rumours

.

22
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Thomas Gordon, one of the traders killed in the
massacre, had
confided to an artist for the Illustrated London
News in the

previous year that an expedition was in the offing, 23
and Sir
Alfred Jephson, the Agent General for the Protectorate
until
1895, related in an interview for The Times

,

"It has always

been recognized that eventually Benin City must be taken and
trade allowed to flow towards the sea, but it was clearly

understood that the King could not be smashed without the
employment of a properly prepared force." 24

The implicit

criticism of Phillips, which only came out officially in
1899, and the hint that policy questions were involved went

unnoticed.

The overwhelming impression created by the press

was that the expedition being mounted against the king was a

result of his attack on Phillips.

From the time that the massacre was announced until the

punitive expedition left, the press identified the people of

Benin and the King in an unfavorable light.

As a race they

were "reported to be indolent, cowardly, and chiefly occupied
25
with agricultural pursuits and the production of palm oil."

The Oba of Benin's country is the most barbarous spot of the

whole Protectorate "and the outrage which he has not feared
,

to commit upon the British expedition rendered inevitable the

speedy end of a system which has been allowed to endure too
long."

26

In an article which referred to the King as a "savaj

potentate" the two men who had escaped, Boisragon and Locke

were described as "splendid

f ellows

.

.

.

.

just the men one would

expect to survive the danger, fatigue, and privation of the
long struggle through the bush which they appeared to have
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undergone." 27

To another reporter the natives of
Benin were

"utterly barbarous", ruled by a king of
"fierce and cruel
disposition".
"Human sacrifices are there even more
frequent
than in Ashanti or Dahomey before European
intervention." 28

Consul-General Moor added his weight:
a barbarian". 29

the king was "certainly

An expedition against him would extend British

authority throughout the area, end the atrocities
constantly
committed there, establish peaceable government, promote trade,
and improve the condition of the natives.

Removal of the ruler

would open up the resources of the Protectorate to the entire
population. 30

And in Liverpool, the trader, James Pinnock,

chairing a meeting of the Geographical Society in which Benin
was the center of interest, declared:

"Our bluejackets, West

Indian troops, and forces of the Niger Coast Protectorate

would soon clear this Gehenna, which was at present a disgrace
to the whole civilized world."

31

Behind this type of rhetoric lay the firm conviction that

Britain had a job to do to rescue natives from the clutches of
incompetent and evil rulers.

One writer talked of the veneer

of civilization which often shielded the casual visitor to the

West African coast from the truth:

"Scarcely a few miles from

the station where officialism reigns supreme," he wrote,

"are

to be found the rankest superstitions and a swarming native

population, a prey to fetish worship and the cunning priests
who hold sway in its name.

It is an indisputable fact that,

although in some parts of the West Coast Europeans have traded
and factories have existed for quite 200 years, yet no successful attempt has up to now been made to rescue the native pop-

49

ulation from grovelling superstition and ignorance."

For this

writer Gallwey was the authority and he talked in 1892
about
the disgusting sights he had seen:

"there is little cause to

think that matters have improved since that time

the favor-

ite mode of execution is crucifixion, the victim being sac-

rificed on any occasion when the malevolence of evil spirits
requires to be appeased."

He concluded,

"although little

authentic knowledge of the Benin people is current, the main

characteristics of the surrounding tribes are thought to be
theirs also in an intensified degree, finding expression in

habits of disgusting

brutality and scenes of hideous cruelty

and bloodshed, ordained by the superstition of a degraded race
of savages

.

32
"

Not until February 1st could the press present any infor-

mation about the immediate cause of the massacre, but it only
reinforced the impression already conveyed about Benin.

On

that day The Times carried a first hand report from a Reuters

correspondant in the area.

"The king", he wrote,

"was carry-

ing out an annual butchery of slaves, and did not want to see
the white man, who had been received at Gwato, the landing

place for the city, with a friendly welcome, and who, under
the impression that matters were all right, had proceeded on

their journey.

They simply intended to remonstrate with the

King against these fearful butcheries."

35

That Phillips was

on a purely humanitarian mission, and that the king had perpe-

trated the massacre because he did not want to be interrupted
in the middle of his human sacrifices became an acceptable
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rendering of events.

Added to it was the probability of

treachery.

The king had actually lured Phillips
into an
ambush by ordering a welcome for him,
according to Boisragon,
who stated that as the party advanced
from Gwato the ruler
had sent them cordial messages. 36
The press switched its attention from the
explanations
of the massacre to accounts of the punitive
expedition after
it began on February 15, but the official details
of the mass-

acre and expedition did not shed much light on either
Phillips'

intentions or the Bini motivation for the massacre.

It did

note the size of Phillips party— 11 white men, 200 native
carriers, a government interpreter, the consul-general's chief

cook and clerk,

2

orderlies,

1

store keeper,

1

servant to each

officer, and the drum and fife band from the Protectorate.

The

band had been sent back from Gwato because a friendly chief
along the way had convinced Phillips that it would give a warlike impression.

Its own prior intentions against the king,

the Foreign Office did not reveal and so shed no light on

Phillips' reasons for undertaking the trip.
ied them before leaving.

He had not notif-

The Parliamentary paper included

Moor's estimate of the whole venture in a letter he had written
to Admiral Rawson,

the commander-in-Chief of the punitive

expedition:
"The operations in their result up to the present have not served in any way the ill-fated expedition of the late consul Phillips, all the members of
which, except perhaps a few natives, are, I fear,
murdered; but they will, I trust, be far-reaching
in doing away with a barbarism as appalling as ever

.
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witnessed by Europeans and bringing the benefits
or civilization to a most wretched
people.
At the time Moor wrote, August of 1897, the
king was still
at large in the bush.
Not until 1899 when the last

of the

chiefs involved in the massacre

was

finally brought to trial,

did Moor admit that Phillips had shown poor judgment.

Then it

came out that he had been warned repeatedly by several friendly

chiefs to turn back, but had persisted in pushing on. 39
then, however,

Even

the question of why he had gone could not be

answered

Boisragon published a full account of the trip and the
massacre in September, 1897, but it threw remarkably little
light on the question of motivation.

Could Boisragon not

have known of the plans which Phillips was making with the

Foreign Office?

He recapitulated what had happened in Benin

since Gallwey's visit of 1892.

No white man had been in the

city since then, except MacTaggart of the Royal Niger Company,
the man who had so annoyed Consul-General Moor.

Boisragon

talked of the removal of Chief Nana but gave no reasons for
the attack against him.

He did mention, however,

that in re-

sponse to the treatment meted out to Nana, the King of Benin

had ceased to trade with the British.

^

Boisragon credited

Moor with success in getting Overami to open up trade again,
but claimed that the King started to charge tribute.

Shortly

after Phillips took over in the Protectorate the king raised
his price, and Phillips urged the chiefs of the river not to

—
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pay.

As a result of a meeting of the chiefs,
with Phillips

present, a note went to the king, announcing
a visit.

"The

object of the expedition", according to Boisragon,
"was to
try and persuade the king to let white men come
up to his

city whenever they wanted to.

All their horrible customs

could not be put down at once, except by a strong-armed
expedition; but could be stamped out gradually by officials

continually going up.

Trade would also be opened up." 41 This

line Macdonald had always taken, convinced that inhumane customs had to be stopped, but through peaceful means.

If Phillips

had been committed to these means, why had he written to

Salisbury asking for armed support to remove the king and

establish a native council?

Perhaps his meeting with the

chiefs had occurred after he wrote the letter,

and they

had convinced him that the king would listen to reason. Perhaps he wanted to make a name for himself before Moor returned. 43

Boisragon, if he knew, did not tell.

But he was convinced of

the treachery of the king and the complicity of the whole

countryside.

He recounted how as they passed a certain spot

they had their feet washed by JuJu priests, a sign that they

had the freedom of the country.

Then "At each village, as we

halted, some of the men came out to welcome us, grinned all

round their black faces, and seemed very pleased to

knowing as they did what was in store for us, for

I

see us

suppose

they all expected to get a share of the forth-coming loot."

44

Sufficient cause for the murder, according to Boisragon, had

been the audacity of the white men in coming ahead when the

king did not wish to be disturbed in the midst of
sacrificing "some hundreds of unfortunate slaves."^ 5
The innocence of the king, and his precise role in
the
massacre was not known until late September 1897, but by
that
time the city had been destroyed.

.
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CHAPTER FOUR:

PUNITIVE EXPEDITION

The British Foreign Office mastermined
the expedition

against the king, calling upon the resources
of the admiralty
and those of the imperial forces in Sierre
Leone.
Admiral
Harry Rawson commander of the fleet at the Cape
received
the

supreme command and his orders were to rescue survivors,
to
punish the king, and to occupy the town. 1 By January 30 th
ships and men for the expedition had rendezvoused in Sierre
Leone, coming from the far corners of the empire.

Rawson,

now acting on his own discretion, decided upon a force of a
thousand men,

2

nearly three times the number thought necessary

by the Foreign Office.

Taking no chances he decided upon a

three-pronged attack upon the city which would allow for no
escape to the. south.

Rawson himself would accompany the center

group which would take the city, the other two acting to encircle
the area, and if necessary, drive hostile forces inward.

February

6 th

with all arrangements complete,

On

the slow march

forward began.

When the Foreign Office gave over the commard to Admiral
Rawson, a naval commander who had never set foot in the Pro-

tectorate and who, in his actions there in the first few days

revealed his ignorance of past Protectorate policy, it sanctioned
conquest.

As the three forces advanced towards the city of Benin

they destroyed what lay in their way.

One eye-witness recorded

the procedure followed by the troops upon entering a native

village on the way to Benin:
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As the launch and surf boats grounded
we jumped
into the water, which reached to our waists,
at
once placed our Maxims and guns in position,
firing so as to clear the bush where the natives
might be hiding. We rushed on some hundred yards,

again put our guns in position, and, in conjunct4
ion with volley firing, again cleared the bush
All who stood in their way had become the enemy.

Unfortunately

this carnage was characteristic of the advance.

By the morning of February 17 th the central force, led by

Admiral Rawson and Consul General Moor, and consisting of 250

Protectorate troops, 120 marines, 100 sailors, 30 scouts and
six medical men, was within striking distance of Benin.

All

that day they advanced under heavy return fire in the unaccustomed heat and the unfamiliar terrain,

forced to walk in single

file because of the narrowness of the bush paths.

they camped six miles from Benin.

5

That night

Early the next morning they

broke camp and marched for seven hours, fired upon constantly.
At last, dry, dirty and exhausted, but with their Maxims having secured them entrance, they came to a clearing in the path.

Before them spread out a broad avenue, unlike anything they had
sofar seen, and beyond it, enveloped in a cloud of dust, lay
the ancient city of Benin.

The Bini warriors left in the city fired from behind an

embankment, but the second-hand ordnance of the European trader
to the West African coast could not match British machine guns,

and soon the last of the Oba's men disappeared into the dense
and protective bush.

The city belonged to the British.

Word
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reached London in The Times on February
23rd, with a telegram from Consul-General Moor:
"Advanced from Ologbo 14**
in two columns, joined upon the 16 th

noon 18 th ."

,

Benin city taken after-

In Parliament, at the request of Sir John
Colomb

of Great Yarmouth, Moor's telegram was read to
the house.

6

II

The men, after they had slaked their thirst, now had to

clean up the city.

All natives, including the King and the
*

priests had fled Benin into the surrounding bush to the north

when the fate of the city seemed sealed.
ers taken,

There were no prison-

only the wounded of the attacking force to care for

and the bodies of those left behind by the Binis to be removed.
The seemingly hundreds of corpses which the Punitive force came

upon were not casualties from the fighting, but the remains of
human sacrifices

•

The scene indelibly impressed itself upon

the senses of those who witnessed it.

Felix Roth, a doctor

with the expedition, summed up his reaction:
"As we neared Benin City we passed several

human sacrifices, live women-slaves gagged and
pegged on their backs to the ground, the abdominal wall being cut in the form of a cross, and
These poor women
the uninjured gut hanging out.
were allowed to die like this in the sun. Menslaves, with their hands tied at the back, and
feet lashed together, also gagged, were lying
As our white troops passed these horrors
about.
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When they reached the King's compound they
found things
as they had been left.
Roth described the
scene:

"In the king's compound, on a raised
platform or
altar, running the whole breadth of each,
beautiful
idols were found.
All of them were caked over with
human blood and by giving them a slight tap,
crusts
of blood would, as it were, fly off.
Lying about
were big bronze heads, dozens in a row, with
holes
at the top, in which immense carved ivory
tusks
were fixed.
One can form no idea of the impression
it made on us.
The whole place reeked of blood.
Fresh blood was dripping off the figures and altars..." 8

On the night of the 18 th the men slept out in the open

amidst the death and debri too sickened by the smell of blood
to sleep in the compounds.

The next morning they set about

burning those compounds and destroying the JuJu houses.

All

through the city they came upon bones, skulls and bodies.
In front of the palace they found trees upon which human

sacrifices had been carried out, and heaps of bones mildewed

around the bottom. In the surrounding bush they found more
bodies, decapitated.

"It was a grusome sight," wrote Roth,

"to see these headless bodies sitting about,

awful." 9

the smell being

The troops discovered a large pit full of bodies

from which emanated screams.

To their surprise they managed

to pull out some of the carriers who had been with Phillips.
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Those unfortunates told how Phillips and
his men had been
killed on the Gwato road, but not brought
in to the city to
be sacrificed.
Only their belongings reached the Palaver
house where Roth and the others found them. 10
In the midst of the blood Roth's sense
of beauty was. also

touched.

He thought the King's house really quite
extra-

ordinary.

He made note of the delicate brass figures
embossed

on the doors of the palace, and of the artistically
carved

rafters. 11

writing

Another eye-witness, Intelligence Officer Bacon

later, was also moved to comment on the "handsomely

carved ivory tusks" and the "very antique bronze heads." 12
Some of the objects, he thought, showed traces of Egyptian

design, or perhaps Chinese influence. 13

In a tour of the

city he saw no evidence of industry other than a blacksmith's
shop and perhaps concluded that the art objects were not

indigenous.

Their beauty was marred, however, by the use to

which they were put:
ed over bronzes,

"Blood was everywhere," he wrote,

"smear'

ivory, and even the walls, and spoke the his-

tory of that awful city in a clearer way than writing ever
could.

And this had been going on for centuries!

Not the

lust of one king, not the climax of a bloody reign, but the

religion (save the word!) of the race.
On the 20 th the systematic destruction of the city began.

Admiral Rawson, with a strong force went to Ojumo, a chief's
compound, at the beginning of the Gwato road and burned it.

:

He also burned chief Ochudi's compound,
consisting of more
than a hundred houses, "whose roofs made
a good blaze." 15
On Rawson's orders all the houses in
the area about the King's
compound were cleared for purposes of protection. 16
Another
party went to the Queen Mother's house and
destroyed
it.

On the 21st an unplanned fire broke out in
the afternoon.
It jumped from hut to hut, even burning
the trees.
Roth
commented
"As soon as we noticed it, we removed our medical
stores; the men tried to move their stores but were
too late, and most of them had everything burnt.
Even the things which had been placed in the middle
of the big compounds caught fire, the heat being
very great. In less than an hour the conflagration had burnt itself out, and the whole place was
strewn with ashes.
The next day we found what a
blessing had come to us, for fire, smoke and charcoal seemed to have removed all the smell, and the
city became sweet and pure again."- -'
1

Bacon's opinion of the fire matched Roth's.

To him:

"there was a dim grandeur about it all, and also
there seemed to be a fate.... fire only could
purge it, and here on our last day we were to
see its legitimate fate overtake it, and see
this, the centre of bloodshed, burn before our
eyes in retribution for the millions of lives
that had been wilfully sacrif iced " 18

•

.

On the morning of the 22nd, as Moor had predicted, the

white force, having accomplished its mission, prepared to

march back to the sea.

Only on the next day would London

learn of their success, and readers of The Times be treated
to the Reuter's description of Benin:

"The whole town reeks

of human blood, and the bodies of many sacrificed and crucifie
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human beings have been found about the
place.
This afternoon the forces have been occupied in
the destruction of
•crucifixion trees' and -JuJu' houses, thereby
breaking the
power of the fetish priests." 19
The Commander-in-Chief and his naval
brigade reached

Warrigi on the Z4*; the Sapobar force on the
25*, and the
Gwato force, on the 27 th
By the evening of the
th
27

.

whole white force had reembarked.

the

A week later the hospital

ship Malacca left for Britain, and on March 13 th Admiral
Rawson was back in South Africa.

The force, and indeed the

Expedition, won praises and encouragement from the press and

honors from the Queen.

Rawson was elevated to the Order of

the Bath, and 18 awaras went to officers who had taken part
in the expedition.

20

Ill

Once the navy and marines had left the city the officials
of the Protectorate set about organizing an administration.

Moor felt it imperative that he finish the expedition according to his own lights,

King.

including the final deposition of the

"It is imperative" he wrote to Salisbury,

"that a most

severe lesson be given the Kings, Chiefs, and JuJu men of all

surrounding countries, that white men cannot be killed with
impunity, and that human sacrifices, with the oppression of
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the weak and poor must cease,- 2 ^

Moor felt that the permanent
results expected from the
expedition had not yet been
achieved
"The punishment of the
individuals responsible
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When a Permanent Resident for
Benin was appointed, Moor
was free to pursue the King into
the bush.
Moor had never doubted the king
guilty of the Phillips
massacre, nor had any other British.
It was Bertie's note
to the War Office of January 14<*
which reflected
this

assumption as did Galfwey's ultimatum to the
king, forwarded
to the Foreign Office. 23
As more information about
events

in Benin filtered out, his guilt seemed
assured.

The Times commented on the

9 th

,

Perhaps, as

the king might have been mis-

guided by reports from his chiefs to the effect that
the white
men were spies.
If so, Moor might prove complicity and arrest
them as well as the king.
On March 12* the Consul reported
to Salisbury that he had tracked after the king to
the north,

through

7

villages, meeting no resistence.

He had, he told

Salisbury, come upon a new bush town of probably 2000-3000.
The inhabitants fled before he could catch them, and he burned
the town.
In one village Moor caught the headman and demanded that

he and two others serve as guides on pain of death for a false
lead.

After the headman was killed in an attempt to flee, the
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other two served adequately.

Moor was especially proud of

the destruction of the "embryo town."

He described it for

Salisbury as having apartments for the King and
Chiefs on the
model of Benin.
"I am inclined to think" he
wrote,

"that the

destruction of this bush town will have as much effect
on
the taking of Benin City, for the Bini little thought
that
they could be tracked into the fastness of their bush, and
I

anticipate that it will eventually result in the King and

Chief's coming in." 25

Moor was patient, confident of his tactics in burning
the last hope of the King, but the King remained illusive.

Moor decided to attend to other duties in the Protectorate.
He returned to Old Calabar and in the beginning of August

word reached him that the king had given himself up on August 3rd. It seems he could neither hide nor run.
old

The 40 year

King, Overami, whom Roth considered "stout" and "intelli26

gent", with about 800 followers, 20 wives and 10 chiefs, led

by messengers carrying a white flag, proceeded into town in
the wake of a reed band.

they saw him enter.

The white men hid themselves when

The King established himself in the house

of Chief Abeseke, who was now a member of the native council

established by the Resident.

Two days later, Overami nerved

himself to enter the Palaver house with his boys and several
chiefs where the Acting Resident, Roupell received him.

Roupell had tactfully kept his own forces out of sight, although
they were prepared to act instantly should the need arise.

s

"
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The King, in his ceremonial dress,
was, in Roth's words,
"covered with masses of strings of coral,
interspersed with larger pieces, supposed to
be worth
many pounds
His head dress, which was in
the
shape of a Leghorn straw hat, was
composed wholly
of coral of excellent quality, meshed
closely
together, and must have weighed very heavily
on
his head
for it was constantly being temporarily
removed by an attendant. His wrists up to
the
elbows were closely covered with coral
bangles
so were his ankles.
He only wore the usual white
cloth of a chief, and underneath, a pair of
embroidered and brocaded trousers; he had nothing
in the way of a coat, but his breast was
completely hidden from view by the coral beads
encircling6
z 1
his neck
.

Roupell called out for Overami to make his submission.

The

King, obviously agitated, consulted with his chiefs, while
a crowd of about 1000 people gathered.

Chief Aro asked if

the King could not submit in private, but Roupell refused.

This scion of an ancient house was forced to make submission
in his accustomed manner.

He knelt on the ground before the

young Roupell, and rubbed his forehead in the ground three
times.

28

The chiefs followed the example of their leader.

Roupell then explained to Overami that he was no longer King,
but a political prisioner.

The Acting Resident could do no

more, as Moor was not expected back for another two weeks.
The King returned to Abeseke's house.

Inevitably, in keeping with Moor's views of Overami'
guilt, the British determined to try the fallen monarch. The

trial began on September 1st in the late afternoon.

Consul

Moor called upon witnesses and cautioned them to speak the
truth.

He told them that the trial was not about the fighting,

^
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because they could be proud of the courage with
which they
defended their country, but that it was about the
death of
Phillips.
The trial, he told them, would be conducted

according to native law, and the 1st thing to settle
was
who had ordered the massacre, King or chief.
The first witnesses, three chiefs' boys, attested that

although they knew the expedition was unarmed, their chiefs
instructed them to kill the white men.

The chiefs thus named

were arrested and put in the guard room.

When one of them

committed suicide by hanging himself his body was strung up
for a day in front of the King's compound.

On the 3rd day Moor summoned the chiefs as witnesses.
One after another they defended the innocence of the King.

According to Benin custom he never left his compound.

Chiefs

came to him, he gave them orders, and then they did as they

thought fit.

Overami, occupied with an annual festival at

the time of the Phillips expedition, was informed of the

movements of Phillips by his messengers.
that no harm was to be done to them.

Indeed he wanted to

talk with Phillips to see if he meant war.

ignored him.

He stated explicitely

But the chiefs

Testimony singled out as the leader one in

particular, Ologbosheri.

Evidence also emerged that the

chiefs had feared, from the time of Nana's exile, that their
turn was coming. They were of course correct in their estimate
as the previous narrative attests, but the trial concerned

itself only with the massacre in its narrowest sense.
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On September 3rd the court met for a
verdict.

Moor

asked for a definition of native law and
was told by the
chiefs that since seven white chiefs had
been killed, seven
black chiefs must die. But the Consul
General wished to
sentence only those who had discovered the white
men
to be

unarmed but attacked anyway.

He found six chiefs guilty.

Of the six, two were already dead, one was a
boy, one was
at large, and two were in his hands.
to be shot the following morning.

Moor condemned them

Ologbosheri, the insti-

gator, was at large. The Consul General suggested that the

other chiefs find him, or Britain would exact the full price

demanded by native law.
The executions took place the following day.

Then it

was Moor's duty to explain to the king what would befall him

Moor told him, according to Roth, that he
"could no longer order the people about as before,
but ... .proper villages would be apportioned to him,
with servants, food, and all other necessaries as
for a big chief, for he would probably still be
the biggest chief, that position depending upon
his ability to govern.
At the same time, the Consul-General proposed to take the king and two or
three chiefs, with their wives and servants, on
a tour for a year or so to Calabar, Lagos and the
Yoruba country to see how other lands were governed.

1,30

Moor then told Overami to cons ider the matter and report to
the Palaver house on September

9 th

.

How much Overami under-

stood of what was happening to him and of what his future

held one cannot know.

Having fled once from his city and

.
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attempted, in a futile gesture, to
build a new Benin in the
bush, he decided once more to deny
the fait accompli which
had displaced him. He refused to
appear on that day and Moor
sent a guard of fifty men to bring
him to the Palaver house.
Frightened, Overami fled into the bush
again.
Moor then
threatened to burn every house and shoot every
chief if
Overami did not appear by 4:00 P.M. Chief
Ojumo finally
admitted that the king was hiding in his compound.

Roupell went with a few men to the compound.

He went

in by the front door and sent the others around
to the back.

When Overami heard noise in the front he rushed out by
the
back, only to find himself in the arms of the others.

He

was taken back to Moor who, on the spot, sentenced him to
be banished for life from Benin. 31

Moor had obviously decided that the king would be difficult to deal with in the native council, and his exile would

better serve imperial purposes.

Overami, now very dejected,

attempted to bribe the Consul General with 200 puncheons of
oil and 500 ivory tusks.

Moor refused.

On the 15 th in the

dead of night so as not to excite the people, the troops

brought Overami, bound and gagged, in a hammock, down to
Gwato
Readers of The Times in London learned on September 24 th
that:

"The King of Benin has been put on board the Protector

ate Yacht Ivy in order to be taken to Old Calabar."

It was

from the Commander of the Ivy that the first word of the
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massacre had come to London, following
the rescue by the
Commander of that ship, of Boisragon and
Locke.

On the next

day, September 25*\ an exhibit of
bronzes from Benin opened in
the Assyrian basement of the British
Museum.

,,

.

,,

,

.
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CHAPTER FIVE:

THE BRONZES

The show in the Assyrian basement of the British
Museum
in September 1897

contained about three hundred bronze plaques.

The papers thanked Lord Salisbury and Consul-General
Moor for
making the exhibit possible. They failed to credit
Admiral

Harry Rawson, though he was as responsible as Salisbury
and

Moor

When the Admiral's flying column had entered the city of
Benin on the afternoon of the

18 th they had

proceeded down the

broad streets directly to the King's compound.

The compound

was huge, several acres in size, and with many buildings. Amid
the debrisof bodies, blood, dirt and signs of hasty departure
the men saw metal and ivory objects.

The imperial forces immed-

iately organized a search and in one of the many buildings they
found hundreds of plaques together, half buried and covered with

dried blood.

Rawson and Moor, realizing that the deserted city

was full of these objects, took council.
hideous,"'"

Moor thought them

tangible proof of the evils of superstition, but

Rawson thought they might have some historical interest.

2

Rawson cabled to the Foreign Office announcing the find,

3

then put his mind to other matters.

everything of value in the city.

and

He gave Moor charge of

The Consul-General ordered

all objects brought to one place, and ordered his troops not to
loot.

Then he posted a guard over the central area and, in agre

ment with Rawson, allowed trophies to all officers involved in
the expedition.

The Admiral picked out what he wanted for him-

self and chose a large carved tusk for a gift to the Admiralty
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Office and a suitable trophy was also chosen
for the Queen.
Moor, and then all the other officers present
gathered trophies
for themselves.

What remained they packed up.

The control

Moor exercised over looting outside the King's
compound depended upon the integrity of the individuals involved.

Since

only the officers received tangible rewards, many of
the smalle
bronze pieces may have found their way into the pockets
of the

first sailors or marines to lay eyes upon them, and then gone
to England unobserved in seachest or duffel bag.

Since each

house had an altar of some kind, and the compound included not
only the King's but the large compounds

of the chief and the

Queen Mother, the pickings would be easy.
Rawson thought that the British Museum might be interested in what had been officially gathered.

He did not record

whether his men transported these spoils with them when they
left on the 22nd, or whether Moor disposed of them from Benin.

But on the 28 th of February the district commissioner in Sapele

wrote to the Crown Agents in London, announcing the sending of
two bronze plaques, with a request for them to be valued in

England.

Malacca

,

The plaques probably went on the hospital ship

which left for England on March

reached the Crown Agents where Mr.
them.

E.

E.

5 th

.

On the 24 th they

Blake took charge of

He wrote the British Museum asking for someone to come

over and give an opinion.

Mr. Charles Read, who had served

the Museum's Department of British and Medieval Antiquities

and Ethnography since 1880, and had headed it since 1896, came
to look at the bronzes.

He was not an African expert and he re

turned to the museum to do his homework.

He soon found, poss-
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ibly to his surprise, a large body
of literature on Benin at
least in its relation to Europe. While
he studied, Blake, still
with the Crown Agents, cabled Moor to
send home as many more
pieces as he could.
Read had promised an official report.
On
April 2nd Maude Thompson of the Museum
staff informed Blake
that Read, having examined the bronzes,
had concluded that they
were of native manufacture, without, as he put
it, "any admixture of European or other civilized art."
Read felt that since
that was the case the pieces would not shed much
light
on the

history of the city.

Nevertheless, from the point of view of

the evolution of art, he would like more pieces for the
museum.

He didn't suppose the pieces to be of much value financially.

7

At about the same time the Illustrated London News received

drawings from H

.

Seppings-Wright

C.

,

the artist who had arrived

in the city of Benin in the wake of the conquering force.

At

the end of March the paper ran a large supplement, complete

with drawings by Seppings-Wright, on Benin.

The author of the

article, possibly Seppings-Wright, who had arrived after the
loot had been divided up or packed away, lamented that the fire

had raged through the city,

"spoiling all the valuable ivory

tusks and other curios which had been stored in the center of
the palaver house."

g

Apparently he was completely unaware of

the existence of the official booty.

on April 10 th

,

In a follow-up article

entitled "Spoils from Benin", the author again

expressed distress at the loss of objects which would have
been of great antiquarian interest,

"relics of a civilization

which dates back far beyond the Portuguese colonization of three
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centries ago, and probably owes
much to Egyptian influence
Seppings-Wright, if he were the
author, may have picked up
some gossip in the camp from
among the more sensitive

»

9

officers.

The origin of these pieces
must have stirred speculation
from
the first.
The author believed, however,
that Mr. W. J. Hider,
a sailor, who had stored his
collection in a building with a
brass roof possessed the only
objects to survive the flames.
When he returned to England Hider
immediately sold his objects
to Mr.Horniman for his free
ethnographic museum at Forest Hill.
The paper noted that the collection
contained two hand bells
"rung to announce a human sacrifice." 10

While the press published its limited
information, official
interest in the bronzes continued, although
no one ever explained how the pieces survived the flames and
were removed from
Benin.
After Read had given his opinion to the Crown
Agents

and Moor had been notified, the two plaques sat
in Blake's offic
On the 14th of April he wrote to the Consul-General
asking him

what to do next.

Should Blake send them to the Museum, or to

the Foreign Office?

Moor apparently replied that they now be-

longed to the Foreign Office and should go there.

Accordingly,

Blake announced to the Foreign Office on the 13 th of May that
he was sending them two bronze plaques from Benin. 11

Fraser

of the Chief Clerk's Department at the Foreign Office scribbled

on Blake's note "....await the arrival of the other bronzes and

then see if the British Museum or South Kensington will buy." 12
Someone else along the line of command changed the order, scribb
ling underneath,

"They belong to us.

send them over." 13

Please ask Crown Agents to

"

,
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The two bronze plaques thus reached the
Foreign Office
where they remained, since no one took personal
charge of the
loot.

On June 30 th the Crown Agents informed the
Foreign Office
that three "very bulky" casks containing bronzes
from Benin
had arrived and lay in the Quadrangle near the
entrance to the

Colonial Office.

The agents requested instructions from the

Foreign Secretary as to their disposal "as we have no instructions as to the wishes of the Commissioner." 14

At this point

someone informed Clement Hill of the situation and Hill requested
further background information.

Clerk Fraser wrote, in his own

hand
"The history of these bronzes
is to the best of
my recollection as follows.
Some time ago when I
went to see Mr. Blake he showed me the two bronzes
which are at present in our room which had just
been sent here by Moor from Benin who had said
there were a lot more which it was proposed to
sell that the market value of such things is very
little and must now be less than ever in consequence
of the large number that must have been brought home
by officers not to mention that to throw puncheons full on the market at once would bring it down
to zero

—

.

Hill commented on the memo:
"If the market value has gone down it seems hardly
worth while to have brought them over. Perhaps we
had better tell treasury in the first instance, as
they may claim the bronzes as part payment of the

Benin expenses."
To inform the treasury, however, raised a question of policy,

for treasury interference might limit, as Fraser observed,

the decision-making power of the Secretary of State with regard
to revenue raised in the Protectorate.

ed from Protectorate Revenue.

Imperial expenses differ-

Fraser in his response to Hill

wrote that selling puncheons of curios to offset the expenses

:
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of the expedition "is somewhat of a new departure as
regards

the Niger Coast Protectorate where being a self-supporting

institution the Secretary of State, i.e., the Foreign Secretary,
represents the Lords of the Treasury in matters of finance."
The Foreign Secretary could himself decide on the sale of the

bronzes without consulting the treasury,

"

a course which

might be highly inconvenient at some later date."

Hill, in

turn, resenting the implied aspersion upon his intelligence,

commented
"This is hardly put correctly.
My idea was that
before disposing of the contents of the casks we
should ask Treasury whether they had any wishes
or views as to the best method.
They will certainly pay, either directly or through the Admiralty, the greater part of the cost of the expedition,
and may expect a voice in the disposal of the plunder.
Say the loot had mounted up to a million sterling, would you have given it all to the Protectorate without consulting Treasury?"

Fraser replied on July 14 th

:

feel is that the Treasury is in no better
position than the Secretary of State to decide
what is the best method of disposing of these
curios and that if we consult them on what is
practically a money point we shall be introducing
a new system which it will be subsequently difficult
If the Treasury were going to pay the
to stop.
whole of the expedition expenses they might have
some interest in the disposal of the plunder which
would (help) to reduce those expenses but as, in
accordance with settled policy in these cases, they
will only demand a contribution from the Protectorate and will fall under the general direction of
My suggestion is that after
the Secretary of State.
inviting the inspection of' the British Museum and
perhaps S. Kensington any of the curios not required
might be sold under the direction of the Crown
Agents, and the proceeds of the sale credited to
the funds of the Protectorate."

"What

I

6
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Hill yielded the point on the

L7«>,

"I

have no objection.

only wish was the the Treasury should not be able
to blame

My

us—

Proceed as Mr. Fraser suggests."
On that same day, a note came to the Foreign Office from
the Crown Agents marked PRESSING.

It

announced the arrival of

three more casks and asked for orders as to their disposal. 15

Hill endorsed the message:

"We are waiting a decision on theirs

of June 30 th as to how to proceed", and then composed a memo-

randum to acquaint Salisbury with the facts.

It related that

six casks of bronzes had now been sent to England by Consul

General Moor:
"The question arises whether they should be
sold by public auction, the British Museum being
given the chance of selecting what it wants, and
the proceeds paid into the Protectorate accounts,
or whether the treasury should be consulted as to
their disposal.
The treasury has nothing to do
with the funds of the Protectorate but it is possible that it may claim the curios as loot, if the
Imperial Government pay the expenses of the Benin
Expedition without asking for a Protectorate contribution.
The chief Clerk's Department advocate
sale without consulting treasury."

Hill clearly did not want to be responsible for a decision which

might later prove sticky.
added an "S" in red.

1

Salisbury scribbled in "Yes" and

The matter interested him very little.

The six casks now went over to the British Museum where

they were cleaned, analyzed as to metallic content, and pre-

pared for exhibit.

The Foreign Office deemed them saleable

objects, similar to the gold cups from Ashanti which had been

melted down to pay military expenses.

They constituted

.
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official booty, to be used to help in future
development of
the Protectorate.

Rawson had originally claimed 1000 pieces as official
booty. 17 Only three hundred pieces graced the museum.
Seven
hundred remained unaccounted for. Furthermore a vast
amount
of bric-a-brac and smaller objects had never been
officially

declared.

Since Admiral Rawson had originally supposed the

objects of possible historical interest, he and Moor no doubt

agreed that a representative selection rather than the whole
lot would be sufficient to send to England.

Accordingly they

sold off the excess.

"The greater part

Moor later commented:

of the property of value found was disposed of locally as oppor

tunity offered, or shipped home

.

.

.

.

I

think speaking from memory

that ab out L1200 or L1500 was realized locally and credited

Protectorate funds."

18

tc

He did not name or describe the local

buyers

German companies along the coast of West Africa controlled
the art market companies at this time.

19
'

In whatever the way

the pieces got from Benin to the coast, many of them fell into

the hands of German dealers.

Several pieces from Benin were

presented to a German Anthropological Association meeting in
Luebeck in August, 1897.

20

Many more pieces also began to

show up in London at art dealers and auctioneers' houses.
large auction held at Hale's and Son, London,

21

A

came to the

attention of a young German anthropologist, Frederick Von
Luschan.

He arrived in the knick of time to buy several items
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for the Berlin museum.

The objects so impressed him that he

informed himself of the events surrounding their arrival in
England, and on a hunch, cabled the German Consulate in Lagos,
to buy up all available antiquities from Benin, regardless of
price. 22 Consul Edward Schmidt followed his advice and pur-

chased a large number of pieces then available in Lagos.

An-

other German named Bey put together an even larger collection
of 176 pieces from the coast market.

Individual British collectors also acquired privately

many of the antiquities.

Probably at the Hale's and smaller

auctions General Lane Fox Pitt-Rivers picked up some examples
of work from Benin.

23

Pitt-Rivers, a wealthy colonial official

and ethnologist, had collected artifacts from the colonies for

decades.

A friend of the famed anthropologist Edward Tylor,

the General exhibited his collection in his own museum in Ox-

Pitt-Rivers constantly watched for objects which would

ford.

fill out his collections, and that summer of 1897 must have

been a fruitful time.

The British Museum by contrast, always

short of funds, apparently could buy only one ivory tusk at
-i

the sales.

24

When the exhibit of plaques opened at the Museum on September 25 th

,

an article in The Times commented that they would

be of great value in helping to assign other objects from

Africa to their proper area.

In themselves,

the author noted,

"both by the novelty of the subjects and the technical perfection of the work,

(they) are surprizing evidence of the skill

8

82

of the Benin native in the casting of
25
metal.-

The reporter

only echoed the opinion of experts for,
as Charles Read wrote
shortly after:
"....at the first sight of these remarkable
works of art we were at once astounded at
such an unexpected
find, and puzzeled to account for so highly
developed an art

among a race so entirely barbarous as were the
Bini
It shocked the experts

1,26

to discover that the process by which

the bronzes had been cast was the same as that which
had pro-

duced "the finest bronzes of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Europe

2 7
»

The Times reporter still doubted

whether the bronzes should be called art, but that they were
well cast he could not deny.

He referred to the attempts by

the experts to discover their origin and, echoing Read,
ed

lament-

:

"....there was a faint hope among those who thought
of possibilities, that among the loot from Benin
might be found some traces of the more ancient
civilizations of Northern Africa, drifted down among the
unheeding negroes through the trade routes which
have served from time immemorial as the avenues
by which the great natural riches of Central Africa
reached the Medite rranean. " 2
To think the natives of Benin had made the pieces on their own

was sofar impossible:

"....whether they are the work of negroes or of some
wandering tribe of alien craftsmen, with whom casting was a hereditary occupation, they are certainly
the most interesting works of art which have ever
left the western shores of the Dark Continent."^"
Read's immediate reaction upon seeing the pieces had been
to suppose Binis had made them. But as he read the early history

of Benin he changed his mind.

That Benin was"one of the first

"
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important negro kingdoms which became known to
Europeans" 30
did not sufficiently explain to him how the bronzes
had been
made.
He believed that the kingdom had been oriented
to the

north, and thus open to possible influence from the
Mediterranean.

"Who can say", he wrote,

"what shreds and patches of

Mediterranean civilization may not have drifted with the drifting people far into the darkness of the interior?" 31

The cire

perdue, or lost wax process by which the casting was done was
so intricate that only those long acquainted with casting could

have used it.

Read commented:

"

we thus find the Benin

savages using with familiarity and success a complicated method

which satisfied the fastidious eye of the best artists of the
Italian Renaissance."*32
ist!

How shocking to the cultural evolution

Read valued the pieces chiefly because they constituted

a collection,

"so large and various as to furnish a complete

history of the dress, weapons, and ceremonies of the Benin
•

natives

.

33

Officials at the museum were now eager to make sure that
they could keep permanently the bronzes presently on exhibit.

Maude Thompson wrote a personal letter to Salisbury on

E.

December 28 th

,

noting that the "remarkable collection" had

excited interest from the general public as well as the
scientific community.

I

"This interest" he said

"is caused by the unusual and unexpected style of
the art, and by the rarity of objects of any kind
The collection now defrom the city of Benin.
posited here shows that at some former time there
was in Benin a highly developed art of modelling
and casting of metal though the decline of the kingdom during the last hundred years would appear to
The
have led to the abandonment of such crafts.
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tablets or panels of bronze number
about three hundred, and although there are, strictly
speaking
no duplicates among them, yet in
several instances
the same subject is repeated with
slight variations." 34
He further commented that he understood
the show was to continue until January and that in the meantime
he was to choose

those which he wanted for the Museum's
permanent collection,
returning the others to the Crown Agents "to
be sold for the

benefit of the Niger Coast Protectorate".

He informed the

Prime Minister that he had made his selection and
that it
included two hundred plaques.
"The trustees consider

these

objects of sufficient interest", he informed Salisbury,
"to

make them the subject of an official publication to be issued

shortly in which the property of the Museum will be figured.
For this reason it is important to have your Lordship's con-

firmation of the understanding above mentioned, in order that
the publication may be proceeded with, and

I

have therefore to

ask if your Lordship will be pleased to authorize the Trustees
to retain the desired selection."

Francis Bertie replied for Salisbury that the Foreign

Office had no objection.

35

It would,

however,

like to know

when the remainder of the plaques would be returned to the
Crown Agents, and would also like to have six copies of the

proposed publication.

Thompson,

in turn, assured Bertie that

six copies of the book would be sent, and that the panels would
be sent to the Crown Agents on or about the 25 th of January. 36

On February

8 th

the Crown Agents informed the Foreign Office that

they had delivered the 104 expected bronze plaques.

What
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should they do with them? 37

"Mr. C.

H.

Read," one of the

Crown Agents said, "of the British Museum has suggested
that
private collectors and foreign museums should be allowed
to

purchase some of these bronzes and has offered to advise as
to the prices which should be required in each case.

And

with the Secretary of State's approval we propose to dispose
of the bronzes accordingly."

The Secretary of State approved.

Pricing of the objects and arranging the sale took some time.
At the end of April, Blake from the Crown Agents wrote again
to the Foreign Office announcing the arrival of eleven more

bronzes with no instructions as to their disposal.
had looked at the new arrivals and selected two.
ing nine, Blake reported,

3^

Read

The remain-

"we would propose to dispose of in

the manner authorized in your letter of the 22 February."

Meanwhile, Ralph Moor now back in London, had gone to the

Foreign Office apparently to bestow gifts of Benin trophies

upon various officials who had been involved in planning the
punitive expedition.

Someone had scribbled a note on the back

of Blake's letter questioning Moor's right to distribute the

loot as gifts.

Then he crossed it out, adding "The question

of the Benin bronzes presented by Sir R. Moor to members of

the African Dept. ought not to be discussed on the back of a

letter from the Crown Agents respecting other bronzes intended
for account of the government.

I

make a minute on the subject

"

regret that
O

Q

I

was induced to

He had mistakenly assumed

that all objects from Benin were to be handled as the 300 bronze
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plaques had been.

"If Sir R.

Moor','

he further noted,

"made

a present to certain members of the Foreign
Office of bronzes

which personally belonged to him,
is required.

I

do not see that any decision

If that is not so", he continued,

"or if there is

any doubt on the subject, there should be a minute stating
the

circumstances and Sir

R.

Moor's opinion as to his right of

property and presentation, in order that Lord Salisbury's

decision may be obtained."
Sir R. Moor's

He concluded "I do not know what

'share of the loot' means exactly

— but

it does

not sound as if it could be quoted to the Auditor General of
the House of Commons."
.

The whole question of the rights of looting had not hitherto

been examined.

The fortuitous appearance of Ralph Moor giving

out trophies coinciding with the disposal of the declared

official booty, had raised the question.

A search was ordered

by the Foreign Office to see just what the regulations regarding looting were.

On May

7 th

a lawyer at the Foreign Office,

Mr. Clarke, reported on his findings.^

"The Naval Prize Regulations (Navy List - p. 769)
which, at least so far as the Naval Brigade was
concerned, should properly be applicable to the
Benin Expedition do not unfortunately say anything about captures by land and have therefore
no bearing on the matter.
Army Prize forms the subject of a voluminous
Blue Book issued in 1864 which contains amongst
other matter a scale of the various amounts of
prize money receivable by officers and men of
all ranks from a commander in chief to a bugler.
The regulations however, to be found there, including a Treasury Minute, seem to contemplate
only operations on a large scale; and something
more germane to the matter in hand may perhaps
be found in a remark in a letter from the Secretary to Chelsea Hospital by whom all questions
of prize, etc., are dealt with to the effect
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that "sometimes after the capture of small quantities of booty the General Officer commanding
takes on himself to distribute it on the spot,
a practice which is irregular but not inconvenient. "
The foregoing remarks show however beyond
all question that the principle of prize or booty
has been recognized for years; and that there need
be no fear lest, supposing the matter brought before the House of Commons or the Auditor General,
either of these authorities should find subject
for remark in the fact of Sir R. Moor having had
a share of the booty taken at the capture of Benin."

Not content with Mr. Clarke's admirable summation of British

policy in the matter, the Foreign Office requested Sir Ralph,
no doubt to his great embarrassment, to submit a memorandum

regarding the bronzes in order to close the issue.
so on June 9,

1898.

41

Moor did

He told of the arrival of the troops

into the city, of Rawson's decision to place him in charge of

all objects of value found in the city, and of his decision
to

forbid looting.

He went on to describe how the objects

were collected together in one place, the officers choosing
each a trophy, and of the subsequent local sales.

"I

may

mention," he commented, "that the stories of Benin City's
stores of ivory and wealth were found to be of the fairy des-

cription, and such new ivory as the King possessed was

I

found

in September last, got away by the Natives and never recovered

and

I

did not think it wise to attempt its recovery."

Moor

mentioned that eight or nine bronzes had been given to the
African Department on the same principle that trophies had
been distributed to those officers actively involved.
concluded,

"I

He

may mention that Her Majesty the Queen was

.
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graciously pleased to accept some trophies of the operations
sent through Lord Salisbury

— and

believe that His Royal

I

Highness the Prince of Wales and the First Lord of the Admiralty
also accepted trophies sent by Rear Admiral Sir

H.

H.

Rawson."

Clement Hill commented dryly, "quite satisfactory".^ 2
The Crown Agents went ahead with the sale of the remaining bronzes.

Charles Read informed Von Luschan of the event

and the German acquired thirty-two plaques for the Berlin

Museum, others going to a private German collector, Dr. Hans
Meyer,

for the Leipzig Museum.

General Pitt-Rivers heard

of the sale and was allowed to choose before the general pub-

Later,

lic.

in commenting on his own collection of more than

300 pieces from Benin/ Pitt-Rivers criticized government policy.

They had as usual taken no anthropological authority along on
the expedition who could have given a clue as to the use of the

objects after seeing them in place.

^

worthless as suppliers of information.
to Dr.

The natives had proven
H.

Ling Roth, brother

Felix Roth, and himself an anthropologist, also criticiz-

ed British policy.

While he complimented Pitt-Rivers on his

speed in buying up what he could, he castigated the government
for letting so many pieces slip out of the country into the

hands of the Germans.

Charles Read, he said, had been hampered

by "want of proper pecuniary support",

as a result:

"Not only was the national institution thus deprived of its lawful acquisitions, but at the same
time another government department sold for a few
hundred pounds a large number of castings which
had cost thousands to obtain, as well as much
,,z+ 5
blood of our countrymen

The Germans, by contrast, had demonstrated alertness.
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"For many years", Roth exclaimed, "the Germans
have foreseen that the study of native races and
their development, a study known to us under the
awkward name of Anthropology, is essential to
every civilized community which trades with, or
is called upon to govern native communities,
and with their characteristic throughness they
have, become leaders in a branch of science in
which the Americans alone have been able to
"4-6
equal them.
.

.

.

German ethnologists could obtain money from their government,
and when that ran out, from their Kaiser, and when that was
finished, from German industry.

So could the Americans.

contrast, the British did not even try to raise money.
ly,

in Roth's mind,

the British lagged behind.

By

Clear-

He felt the

study of native races essential in order to govern them well,
and to avoid bloodshed.

Furthermore, he believed they were

disappearing all to rapidly, if not literally as the Tasmanians had done.

"....The West African will never be wiped off

the face of the earth", he concluded,

the white man alters his beliefs,

"but intercourse with

ideas, customs, and tech-

nology, and proper records of these should be made before we

destroy them."^

Alas, his sensitivity came too late to help

Benin.
By the end of 1898 the cognoscenti knew a fair amount

about Benin.

But the king lived in exile in Old Calabar; the

art of centuries had been dispersed across Europe; and the

kingdom was no longer independant.

.
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